What Work Does Generative AI Do?
Essays SEP 8, 2026
By: Alexander Bick, Adam Blandin, David Deming, Tyler Schumacher
OCT 31, 2016
About the author: Abigail Wozniak is an associate professor of economics at the University of Notre Dame.
Many Americans take pride in the idea that our country offers frequent opportunities for determined individuals to improve their economic lot in life. We imagine earlier generations moving West when agricultural conditions deteriorated during the 1930s; or moving North to fill in-demand blue collar jobs in our manufacturing centers in the 1940s and 1950s; or quickly moving through a series of entry level jobs before settling into the right job match. Yet economists who study these issues have reached a high level of consensus that these types of transitions have declined over the past three to four decades.
Regardless of how labor transitions are measured—as a change of employer, change of industry or occupation, change of location, or movements into or out of work—all are at substantially lower levels today than they were at the close of the 1970s. Rates of employer-to-employer job change have declined 25 percent, and inter-state moves are down 15 percent or more. According to one summary measure, overall fluidity has declined by 10 percent to 15 percent since the late 1970s.
The numbers are clear and there is widespread agreement—something about labor mobility in the United States has certainly changed. But it is less clear, and there is less agreement, about whether this change is good or bad. One leading economist remarked at a recent conference that if we replaced the word “mobility” with “turnover” then we would be celebrating its decline.
This remark highlights that transitions can happen for good and bad reasons. Transitions can indicate that workers are taking advantage of improved opportunities and are reaching better work and location arrangements. Or they can indicate that opportunities are scarce and require extensive searching. Conversely, the decline in transitions may indicate that workers are better matched to or better compensated by their current firms, requiring fewer changes. Or the decline may mean that opportunities for advancement have become fewer and farther between, and possibly, that the risk of an unsuccessful change has become greater.

The broad consensus around declining U.S. labor mobility is a recent development. Although some key research on the question began in the late 1990s, interest in labor market adjustments among scholars and the public took off as the country began what would be a long recovery from the Great Recession of 2007-2009. It was clear to all that many changes would have to be made to return U.S. workers to a situation like that of the mid-2000s. Families would have to move to booming cities from elsewhere. College graduates would have to switch into jobs that more intensively used their skills. Workers who had become discouraged and left the labor force would have to search for and return to employment. Yet as scholars began to look more systematically at measures of these transitions at the close of the last recession, it became apparent that not only had such transitions declined during the recession but in fact had been in decline for decades.
Given that the consensus of broad-based decline in labor mobility is a recent development, it is not surprising that scholars have yet to settle on a single explanation. There is a long list of potential explanations, however, that have been considered, and there has been some success in determining which of these are most plausible.106
Here are four plausible explanations that deserve more investigation:
Here are seven explanations that have been investigated and found to play little role:

Before transitioning to an examination of policies that could boost labor mobility, it is worth pausing to acknowledge what appears to be a puzzle: If employment transitions are declining then why do workers feel so insecure in their jobs? Can it really be the case that workers are staying with their jobs longer when there is broad consensus that the era of “career jobs” is over? The answer to the second question is yes. Job duration has increased at the same time that labor market fluidity has declined. This is in part because of a decline in short-duration jobs—those lasting less than a year or less than a quarter. Yet this brings us back to the first question: Why, then, do workers feel less secure? Potentially it is because the incidence of very long duration jobs has also fallen. So the era of career jobs is ending, but the era of staying with an early employer for months or years longer than one’s parents did is here.
Workers may also feel a heightened sense of insecurity because finding a new job after losing one has become harder. The data show that movement into employment out of non-employment or unemployment has also declined. Separating from an employer without a new job in hand therefore means a longer period of unemployment and job searching than in the past. Although the length of unemployment spells received increased attention during the Great Recession, these are longer-run trends that date back several decades and reflecting a changed landscape of employment in the United States.

The forces behind declining labor mobility likely have deep roots. The fact that they have been in operation for at least three decades suggests they are unlikely to be affected by short-run policy. The fact that the forces themselves remain to be fully determined mean that it is not yet clear what the appropriate long-run policy responses would be. Still, there are at least five concrete policy steps that are appropriate now:
These steps will inform the ultimate long-run policy response and greatly help workers adapt to the situations they face today. Let’s examine each of them in turn.
Given longer tenures that workers have with a given employer, the typical worker may experience unemployment spells that are more distant than in the past. With the decline of “career jobs,” more experienced and higher-skill workers will enter the Unemployment Insurance system. Both forces suggest that UI should be reformed to better serve clients who are at more advanced stages of a developed career. Older UI requirements may be a hindrance to such workers. In many states, for example, job search is monitored by requiring UI recipients to apply regularly for available jobs in their fields. This may not be appropriate for more experienced workers, who may rightly pass on applying for a job in their field that entails significantly less responsibility than they had before. Such workers also may be actively searching without applying for jobs, for example, by attending networking events or arranging informational interviews.
Yet it is important to consider the rising share of unemployed workers who face longer spells of unemployment than in the past. These workers will need longer access to assistance in order to keep them connected to the labor market and prevent large negative consequences to their household budgets. There are many ways to support such workers. The UI system could use data it has at its disposal to try to identify workers most at risk of a long unemployment spell, and direct them to enhanced resources sooner.
Benefits also could be offered at a tapered rate to such workers. The idea here is to lower the monthly benefit amount for at-risk workers in order to extend the total months of benefits. Such workers also might qualify for enhanced benefit access, for example, while they are enrolled in a training program. Increased targeting of benefits streams to those at risk for long-term unemployment seems likely to lead to greater welfare gains than other types of expanded access to UI, such as expansions to allow receipt while holding part-time employment.
There is limited but compelling evidence that relocation can benefit individuals who are strongly encouraged to do it, leading to higher earnings, better health outcomes, and better schooling outcomes for children.107 The evidence is limited, however, and there is also evidence that some families and individuals fare poorly after relocation. It is therefore appropriate to proceed with a limited program using cutting-edge design and careful monitoring to evaluate its impacts. Evidence and theory suggests that the groups most likely to benefit from such a program are young workers and families with young children. Relocation entails fewer benefits for older children and can potentially be detrimental.
The limited evidence also suggests that any voucher amount would need to be fairly large to encourage take up, perhaps equal to 20 percent to 50 percent of the price of a modest home. Such a program might be financed by allowing individuals to borrow (in whole or in part) against future Unemployment Insurance or Earned Income Tax Credit entitlements. The program could, but need not be, targeted by place of origin. Such programs have been tried on a small scale in the United States in the past. Anecdotally these seem to have had low take-up, and there is little evidence of success.108 Improved targeting and high-subsidy amounts could lead to substantially greater successes for such a program.109
Students need to understand that their first job will have a greater impact on their lifetime career path than it did for their parents. They should be encouraged to search more intensively during their first major period of job search. This is a key time in which marginally greater investment in job search could have payoffs decades into the future. Students should be encouraged to be more ambitious than “just finding a job” by sorting out what they want to do later. That first job is increasingly important for their career path, and they should plan accordingly.
Many licensing practices can be reformed to rationalize the system and promote access for new entrants, but the evidence is scant that this will substantially jump start labor mobility. Policy on licensing should therefore primarily focus on access and appropriate burden (requirements) and secondarily on labor fluidity.
All available evidence points to key changes in the way that firms hire and compensate workers, but researchers have limited access to the best available data for investigating these issues and no access to other key information because it simply is not collected. While we collect large amounts of information on individuals and families, the information we collect on what firms are doing to attract and retain workers is extremely limited. The last time the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics was able to field a survey to ask firms about their employer provided training was in 1995.110
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